D r. Lucian Leape is the physician father of the patient safety movement in the United States. Following a successful career as a pediatric surgeon and Professor and Chairman of Pediatric Surgery at Tufts Medical School, Dr. Leape has been a major leader for more than three decades in health policy, specifically, system theory applied to healthcare, medical errors, and patient safety. He was a coauthor of the Harvard Medical Practice Study in 1991 that led to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err is Human in 1999; and was a member of the IOM Committee that wrote the report and also its next report, Crossing the Quality Chasm in 2001. In 1994, he published a significant paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association entitled Error in Medicine, in which he used the word ''error'' to describe the numerous treatment injuries to patients.
Dr. Leape's publications on errors and safety in medicine and his awards for recognition of his major contributions are numerous. He led the efforts to found the National Patient Safety Foundation, which in 2007, established the Lucian Leape Institute. He also received the John Eisenberg Patient Safety Award and the Donabedian Quality Improvement Award. In 2006, he was named by Modern Healthcare as one of 30 people who have had the most impact on healthcare in the past 30 years.
In his contribution to this Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 1 Symposium, Patient Safety-Error Prevention, Dr. Leape speaks directly to orthopaedic surgeons about the major issues confronting physicians/surgeons today, including the barriers to achieving safe health care, what the future holds, and what individuals can do to provide more effective processes for patient care. Along with noting the barriers of modern patient safety, Dr. Leape will emphasize the safety responsibilities of orthopaedic surgeons, while also providing a clear foundation for this symposium.
-James H. Herndon MD
Introduction
Many would agree that the patient safety movement, defined as a concerted effort in health care to reduce treatment-caused injuries, if not always a well-organized one, began with the release of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report ''To Err Is Human'' in late 1999 [5] . Basing its conclusions on work done a decade earlier, the IOM took a clear position that the level of unintended harm in medicine is unacceptably high and that something can, and must, be done about it. It proclaimed for medicine what experts in other fields had long recognized: Errors and harm are far more likely to result from faulty systems than from careless or incompetent people. The IOM laid down the challenge: Launch a major effort to change our poorly designed and harmful systems to make them safe. This concept, that harm results from bad systems not bad people, is literally transforming, since it stands on its head what most of us instinctively believethat errors result from carelessness or incompetence and that those who make them should be punished so they will be more careful in the future. Physicians and nurses, who have been taught how to ''do it right'' through long and arduous training, are especially unforgiving of themselves and others when things go wrong. So, it has been a hard sell.
Yet, it works. Application of systems theory, particularly the use of human factors concepts, such as standardization, simplification, reducing reliance on memory, to change the processes of care to make it easy to do it right and hard to do it wrong has resulted in some stunning successes. One of the most striking successes has been the work of Peter Pronovost MD, PhD, FCCM and his colleagues at Johns Hopkins Medicine. Pronovost and colleagues completely eliminated central line infections in an intensive care unit by standardizing the process of catheter insertion and working effectively in teams [1] . The generalizability of this approach was later proved in Michigan, where 65 hospitals were able to drive their central line infection rates to zero for more than a year [8] .
Less dramatic, but still impressive reductions have been made in medication errors through computerizing prescriptions, the use of bar coding, and elimination of nurses measuring doses of medications. Many hospitals have substantially reduced the rate of falls in their inpatient population by applying systems changes in identifying patients at risk and improving monitoring.
But some errors have not yielded readily to systems change, most noticeably wrong-site surgery, and even the most successful systems changes, eg, central line protocols, have not been adopted by all hospitals. Lay observers legitimately ask why, and we have no good answer.
Even when systems changes are implemented widely, the results often fall far short of those achieved in pilot studies. A recent multistate study [3] of central line protocol adoption, for example, showed only a 40% drop in infections. While achieving that rate of reduction nationwide would save 20,000 lives, an impressive gain, one can reasonably question why they fell short and suspect that many of the institutions did not really implement the protocol 100% perfectly, 100% of the time. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that a similar failure to scrupulously implement timeouts and site identification protocols underlies the disappointing results in preventing wrong-site surgery.
These issues are very much front and center for improving safety in orthopaedic surgery, which continues to be dogged with wrong-site errors and wound infections that are particularly disastrous after joint arthroplasty. Another relevant issue that is not typically thought of as a patient safety concern is overuse, the application of a diagnostic measure or treatment that is not indicated. It has been estimated that at least 30% of care is unnecessary or inappropriate, with even higher estimates in some procedures and operations [2, 4] . Assuming that these patients suffer preventable harm at the same 10% to 20% rate as other inpatients, 3% to 6% of all hospital patients suffer preventable harm from receiving care that was not indicated in the first place. It is estimated that 1.2 million patients undergo back surgery annually. If 30% of these are unnecessary, then 360,000 of these patients are also exposed to the risk of errors and preventable harm.
What Have We Learned About Prevention of Medical Errors and Harm?
Despite the compelling evidence that changing systems actually does reduce harm, it turns out to be very difficult to change systems in practice. Change is difficult in any circumstances, but it seems to be especially difficult in health care. Our systems are the most complex of any industry, involving both sophisticated and ever-changing technology and an incredibly diverse, talented, and highly self-directed workforce. An emphasis on professionalism, while clearly essential, tends to result in people working in ''silos'' where individuals often perform at high levels of ability but sometimes interact little or ineffectively with those in other disciplines.
Many of our systems have not been designed per se; they just grew. One example is the medication ''nonsystem'' in which every professional has a stake, but none has responsibility. Other examples are the operating room, and even clinics and offices where long waiting times are legendary, and often could be eliminated with proper design. To the extent that systems and processes have been consciously designed, it has usually been for the convenience of the caregivers-doctors-not for efficiency or convenience of patients.
While the corollary of the systems change theory is that an individual cannot make major systems changes by himself or herself, traditional organizational structure in health care is, in fact, oriented around individual performance. Changing that focus through organizational redesign using methods such as Six Sigma and Lean has sometimes resulted in major upheavals when individuals were required to give up their long-held prerogatives and habits. ThedaCare (Appleton, WI, USA), for example, experienced the departure of the entire orthopaedic service at one hospital when it undertook major systems changes [9] .
A few organizations, such as Theda-Care, Virginia Mason Medical Center (Seattle, WA, USA), Children's Hospital of Cincinnati (Cincinnati, OH, USA), and Denver Health (Denver, CO, USA), have been successful in implementing systems changes to reduce harm by making dramatic changes in institutional culture. In fact, the major important lesson learned in the past decade of efforts to improve patient safety is that the numerous systems changes, major and minor, required to eliminate harm can only be achieved if there is substantial culture change. Change of this magnitude only occurs if there is determined, visionary, and persistent leadership, backed by fully supportive boards.
What Are the Barriers to Achieving Safe Health Care?
A Dysfunctional Culture
The primary barrier to making these substantial changes is not lack of data, knowledge, or expertise, but the fact that many, probably most, healthcare organizations have dysfunctional cultures that reinforce negative behaviors that block progress.
Healthcare cultures are dysfunctional in that they are unable to consistently deliver a high-quality product, effective care, in an efficient, cost-effective manner. Healthcare cultures are unable to adapt to meet changing needs and restraints, and unable to provide a work environment that is satisfying and empowering for all of its employees.
Most healthcare organizations are wedded to an outmoded hierarchical structure that inhibits communication, stifles full participation, and undermines teamwork. A false understanding of and a fierce commitment to autonomy often trump science and efforts at collaboration. While on the surface, this culture would seem to meet the needs of those at the top (physicians), ironically, physicians are among the most dissatisfied and demoralized. Many nurses also suffer from burnout and low morale.
A Culture of Disrespect A common theme, or root cause of this dysfunctional culture is a pervasive culture of disrespect, learned in medical school and reinforced in daily practice [6, 7] . The most obvious form of disrespect, and what first comes to mind, is the outrageous, humiliating, and disruptive behavior by (usually) a few individuals who are, sadly, present in virtually all hospitals. Toleration of this type of behavior is a source of bewilderment to those from other industries where such behavior is rarely permitted (Steve Jobs really was an exception!). The fact that disruptive behavior is accepted is also incredibly damaging to those who are the targets of such behavior and demoralizing for the entire workforce.
Far more pervasive, however, and in the aggregate probably far more harmful, are covert or passive forms of disrespect, such as failure to comply with rules and protocols (eg, hand hygiene and timeouts), refusal to participate in quality and safety improvement efforts, and failure to participate as a full member of care or improvement teams. When pressed, nonparticipants frequently invoke the principles of professional autonomy.
Misguided Autonomy
Autonomy, defined as the right, and obligation, to use your knowledge, skills, and judgment in the manner you believe is best for your patient, within evidence-based accepted practice limits, is essential both for providing quality care and for professional satisfaction. High-performing, quality-and safety-oriented institutions provide an environment that encourages and supports this type of individual autonomy.
Individual autonomy does not make sense, however, or reasonably apply to the thousands of routines that are essential to modern complex care, such as processing laboratory test results, scheduling operations and visits, transporting patients, and integrating care processes, all of which benefit from well-thoughtout standardized processes. Nor should it apply to care protocols and other types of evidence-based processes where greater efficiencies and safer outcomes result from standardized work. (Think central line protocols, wound care, perioperative use of prophylactic antibiotics, deep vein thrombosis protocols.) When the evidence is there, no one should have the right to deliberately provide care for a patient in a manner that is known to be less effective and less safe.
It is fair to ask to what extent the ''root cause'' of the failure to solve the persistent safety problems of wrong site surgery, wound infections, and unnecessary surgery is a misplaced and misunderstood concept of autonomy that leads to a disdain for protocols, guidelines and other forms of ''outside'' expert opinion and evidence.
Healthcare Financing
The current reimbursement system in the United States is another barrier to achieving safe health care because it provides incentives for overuse of services. It does not require an advanced degree in economics to recognize that when payment is provided by service (rather than by need or outcomes) more services will be provided and the fraction of services of debatable value will increase. As indicated above, by increasing the number of people treated, unnecessary care increases the risk of patient harm.
What Does the Future Hold?
The next decade may prove to be the most tumultuous in medical history. The main thrust of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is to expand health insurance coverage to millions of Americans and eliminate the abuses of the insurance system. Virtually unnoticed in the great political debate is the support in the legislation for multiple approaches to improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care. A central concept is value, defined as quality divided by cost. Many (including the author) believe that improving quality by reducing errors and driving out waste is the most effective and least painful way to produce sustainable reductions in costs.
The vast majority of policymakers and economists (including those who wrote the legislation) support the concept that the main driver of poor value in health care is the current fee-for-service system that provides incentives for overuse and disincentives (ie, little or no compensation) for preventive, coordinated, and comprehensive care. As noted, overuse and lack of coordination, as well as general inefficiencies, increase the risks of errors and systems failures.
In the traditional payment system, adverse events (''complications'') enhance income, while in a prepayment or bundled payment system they are experienced as extra costs that decrease net income. While Medicare has already limited reimbursement for some preventable injuries, the fiscal impact from the new payment methods will be much greater.
The mechanisms for changing the payment system and improving quality of care include Patient-Centered Medical Homes and Accountable Care Organizations, both of which are now in rapidly expanding pilot testing in various parts of the country. While these changes understandably provoke anxiety and fear, they also provide unparalleled opportunity to improve access to care for the previously uninsured and to improve quality of care for all.
What Can the Individual Do?
While nothing is inevitable, these organizational changes in how care is delivered are well underway and seem likely to expand regardless of the fate of the Affordable Care Act. Strong pressure from purchasers (large companies) and payers (insurance firms) to make health care more efficient and less costly was mounting before the legislation was enacted, and has grown stronger since. There have been some early successes, and the cost curve has already started to bend.
For the individual surgeon, the course seems clear: Join the team. If there is anything that we have learned in the past decade it is that patient safety is truly a ''team sport.'' No individual can do it alone. Creating more effective, more efficient, and more satisfying processes for providing care requires making systems changes that will impact a variety of stakeholders. Unless all those stakeholders are at the table, not just physicians and nurses, but also pharmacists, technicians, housekeeping staff, and patients, the process changes that result will not be maximally effective, nor will they be sustained. Making those changes requires that all stakeholders have a voice and be respected for what they bring to the table. Physicians do not necessarily have to lead the teams, but they do have to participate as respectful listeners and contributors.
Patient safety is very likely at a tipping point. We now know a great deal about how to make care safer by changing our systems. After a slow start, we could at last be at the beginning of a steep rise in the learning and adoption curve that will make care an order of magnitude safer. Whether we in fact make those changes and realize that potential will depend in large measure on how much physicians get involved and make it their responsibility. We should act as if our lives depend on it, because they may.
